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Abstract: We develop a generalized production framework with endogenous “production techniques”
that serve to organize raw factor inputs in an effi cient manner. We establish a positive relationship
between production flexibility and cost effi ciency. By allowing firms to differ in technology scales,
capital constraints and technique limitations, we illustrate an amplification of the detrimental effects
of technique limitations by production flexibility. We apply the structure to studying, both theoreti-
cally and quantitatively, the consequences of capital and technique misallocation across firms for the
TFP and the interplay of their TFP effects with production flexibility. Using firm-level data from
U.S. manufacturing industries, we find that, due to the amplification effect of production flexibility,
technique misallocation generates more TFP losses than capital misallocation. Our quantitative
results suggest that the relative importance of technique misallocation on TFP is substantial for a
broad range of manufacturing industries —with larger TFP gains from removing technique misallo-
cation in industries using more flexible production technologies.
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“Why Are Total Factor Productivities Different? My candidate for the factor is
the strength of the resistance to the adoption of new technologies and to the effi cient
use of currently operating technologies, and this resistance depends upon the policy
arrangement a society employs. What is needed is a theory of how arrangement affects
total factor productivity.”[Prescott (1998, p. 549)]
1 Introduction
Thanking to the increased availability of reliable micro datasets, there is a growing literature over the
past decade uncovering the sources of factor misallocation and the consequences for aggregate total
factor productivity.1 This literature not only helps explaining productivity gaps across countries or
sectors, but also provides valuable policy prescriptions for means to advance a macroeconomy. In this
paper, we revisit this important issue by developing a generalized production framework in which
we augment raw measures of factor inputs with production techniques that serve to organize factor
inputs to govern their effi cient usage under currently operating technologies. This enables us to
examine the separate roles played by misallocation of factor inputs and misallocation of production
techniques in aggregate productivity. Our approach in turn delivers new insights toward isolating
the causes and the consequences of misallocation in techniques from that of misallocation in capital.
Almost half a century after the pivotal work by Houthakker (1955-1956), there is a renewed
interest in the microfoundation of the aggregate production function.2 A key ingredient in the
literature is the introduction of factor-specific production techniques. The primary focus of this
line of research has been on qualifying the shape of the aggregate production function based on the
distribution of production techniques or on the adoption or assimilation of a global frontier technology
by local firms. It is, however, in our belief that the incorporation of production techniques is a natural
channel for assessing the macroeconomic consequences of micro-level misallocation as well. Why? To
answer this, let us refer the reader to two strands of management science literature largely ignored
by economists. One strand is on the design for manufacturability (DFM) that specifies the ability
to reorganize under the given input capacity in order to cope with market uncertainty.3 This line of
research emphasizes that DFM is a crucial way for a firm to operate effectively. We argue that DFM
can be captured by production techniques which are subject to a manufacturer’s knowledge scale as
well as technological availabilities. Another strand of the literature is on production flexibility, in
1See Restuccia and Rogerson (2013) for a comprehensive survey of the literature.
2See two pioneer studies by Kortum (1997) and Jones (2005).
3See Youssef (1994) for a literature review.
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particular, studies highlighting operation flexibility, process flexibility and machine flexibility.4 This
line of research elaborates that high manufacturing flexibility can improve upon the competitiveness
and create future options for a firm. We notice the importance of the interplay between DFM and
flexibility in affecting the performance of a firm. Such matters can be conveniently captured in a
framework with generalized Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) technologies where production
flexibility can be measured by the elasticity of substitution between technique-augmented factor
inputs.
Thus, we proceed by going one-step further, sharpening the microfoundation by modeling tech-
niques choice in addition to the neoclassical firm optimization, while allowing firms to differ in their
technology scales as well as in their capital input constraints and techniques limitations. We then
develop a structure to aggregate these heterogeneous firms to produce an industry-level total factor
productivity (TFP) measure, which enables us to isolate, both theoretically and quantitatively, the
TFP effects of capital misallocation from that of technique misallocation.
Specifically, we consider a manufacturing firm producing with the use of two factor inputs, capital
and labor. Each input is augmented by a factor-specific production technique. The two production
techniques are chosen from a technology menu, depending on the technology scale measuring the
capacity of DFM. The two technique-augmented factor inputs are then combined in a CES form
to produce the output. For better illustration, we conveniently divide the production decisions
of the firm into two steps. In the first step, the manufacturer decides on its capital and labor
demands, as in the standard neoclassical framework. In the second step, the manufacturer chooses
a suitable combination of production techniques from a convex technology menu. As a key property
of this benchmark framework, we derive a positive association between production flexibility and
the cost effi ciency of the firm: Flexible substitutability between technique-augmented factor inputs
reduces the unit cost of production. This result echoes the micro-level evidence documented in the
management science literature.
Building upon this benchmark production framework, we incorporate distortionary wedges into
firm’s optimal factor and techniques choice. For better comparison with previous studies, the factor
input wedge is modeled as a capital financing distortion due to financial market imperfections.
The technique choice wedge — new to the literature — is a distortion resulting from a technique
capability limitation. While both distortions, as expected, reduce the cost effi ciency of the firm,
we establish another key property: Flexibility of production amplifies the cost distortions arising
from the technique capability constraint. With a distribution of heterogeneous firms differing in
4See, for example, Gerwin (1993) and Roller and Tombak (1993).
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technology scales and capital constraints and technique capabilities, we show that both capital and
technique distortions suppress firm entry, increase exit and also generate intensive margin resource
misallocation among producers. By aggregating over heterogeneous firms, we construct a new deep-
structural measure of industry-level TFP to reexamine the consequences of factor and technique
misallocation. This industry-level TFP not only depends on firms’physical (quality) productivities
(TFPQ) and the dispersion of their revenue productivities (TFPR), but is, more importantly, also
influenced by the covariance between firms’physical productivities and the distortions. When this
covariance is negative (which is true for a wide range of parameter conditions allowed by technique
capabilities), those firms hit by adverse production frictions get to also become “inherently” less
productive.
Upon learning the theoretical interplay between techniques choice and production flexibility and
its consequences for misallocation and aggregate productivity, an immediate question arises: Is this
new mechanism quantitatively important to explain TFP of manufacturing industries? To address
this, we utilize firm-level balance sheet data from Compustat North America, in conjunction with
industry-level factor elasticity, to separately back out manufacturing firms’capital and technique
distortions. We then compute firms’physical and revenue productivities as well as industry-level
TFPs. As expected, we find that, firms’TFPR rise with both type of distortions, so the dispersion
in TFPR leads to lower industry TFP. However, since capital and technique distortions reduce
firms’TFPQ, we also estimate a negative covariance between TFPQ and TFPR at the firm level.
This latter channel counteracts the adverse consequences of capital and technique distortions on the
industry TFP.
An important contribution of our paper is the investigation of quantitative consequences of the
misallocation of factor inputs and production techniques for firms’performance and industry TFP.
Our quantitative results are threefold: First, technique misallocation measured by the variation in
firms’technique capability distortions accounts for more than half of the intra-industry dispersion
of revenue productivities for all manufacturing industries. Second, the relative importance of tech-
nique misallocation is largely driven by production flexibility with larger TFP gains from removing
technique misallocation in industries using more flexible production technologies. Third, the pres-
ence of technique adjustability —and the resulting negative covariance between TFPR and TFPQ —
reduces the adverse consequence of capital misallocation. To this end, we conduct a counterfactual
exercise with the standard neoclassical framework to show that capital misallocation measured by
the variation in firms’capital distortions becomes quantitatively important for the aggregate indus-
try TFP when techniques choice is absent. We thus echo the Lawrence Klein Lecture delivered by
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Prescott (1998): TFP differences depend crucially on the strength of the resistance to the effi cient
use of currently operating technologies. The underlying policy arrangement causing such resistance
is captured in our framework by the technique capability distortions and the resulting variation in
such distortions due to intra-industry technique misallocation —these are shown to be essential for
the aggregate industry productivity.
Related Literature
The paper is related to two strands of literature. One strand is on understanding the sources
of factor misallocation and the consequences for aggregate productivity. Another strand is on the
introduction of factor-specific production techniques to qualify the shape of the aggregate production
function and to investigate the adoption or assimilation of a global frontier technology by local firms.
The first strand of literature goes back to Banerjee and Duflo (2005) who identify the large
dispersion in the marginal product of capital among firms in India as an important source for
underperformance in overall output. More closely related to our paper are Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Restuccia and Rogerson show that when production distortions
hit physically productive firms, this has quantitatively important consequences for the total factor
productivity of the macroeconomy. Hsieh and Klenow find that when the dispersion in production
distortions are alleviated in India and China to the extent of the U.S., the TFP gap between the
U.S. economy and these two countries could shrink up to 40%. Jones (2013) further elaborates that
misallocation at the micro level leads to lower TFP at the macro level, thereby helping explain cross-
country TFP gaps. To understand the sources of misallocation, Banerjee and Moll (2010), Midrigan
and Xu (2013), Buera and Shin (2013) and Moll (2014) construct dynamic general equilibrium models
of misallocation with capital market imperfections, whereas Jovanovic (2014) studies misallocation
using an assignment framework with heterogeneous firms and workers.
We also work in an environment of factor misallocation, where firms face factor input distortions
a la Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Yet, we go beyond by study-
ing technique misallocation, where firms are subject to different technique capabilities. Moreover,
with our emphasis on production flexibility, we generalize the Cobb-Douglas production function
commonly used in the literature by allowing different non-unity elasticities of substitution for firms
in different industries. Since we consider techniques choice, dispersion in capital and techniques
distortions not only generates an heterogeneity in revenue productivities but also an endogenous
covariance between distortionary wedges and physical productivities. Both channels have quantita-
tively important consequences for the TFP effects of factor and technique misallocation.
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The second strand of literature owes to the seminal work by Houthakker (1955-1956), where firms
produce with different Leontief technologies (local production) with production techniques following
a Pareto distribution. The aggregate (global) production across production units then exhibits the
Cobb-Douglas form. Kortum (1997) shows that if researchers sample production techniques from
Pareto distributions, then productivity growth is proportional to the growth of the research stock and
accounts for the empirical regularities concerning productivity growth and researcher employment
observed over the past 50 years. Jones (2005) generalizes Houthakker’s result and shows that as
long as the techniques arrive to firms following a Pareto distribution, firms’global production would
be Cobb-Douglas. Wang, Wong and Yip (2013) develop a technology assimilation framework using
the global technology approach and show that the lack of assimilation of the frontier technology can
be instrumental for differentiating between trapped and growth miracle economies. Also related to
our paper is the framework of Caselli (1999), Acemoglu (2003), and Caselli and Coleman (2006).
In Caselli (1999), firms decide both on production factors and techniques, whereas in Acemoglu
(2003) firms undertake both labor- and capital-augmenting technological improvements. Caselli and
Coleman (2006) investigate the implications of endogenous techniques choice for the cross-country
technology frontier.
As in this second strand of literature, we also explore an alternative production framework
incorporating the concept of production techniques at the firm level. Yet, we differ by modeling
techniques choice under a generalized CES framework with a distribution of firms heterogeneous
in their technology scales as well as in capital and technique distortions. Thus, we are able to
highlight the role of production flexibility as well as to differentiate technique misallocation from
factor misallocation. By developing a structure to aggregate these heterogeneous firms to produce
industry-level TFP, we can then study the TFP effects of capital and technique misallocation in
isolation, both theoretically and quantitatively.
2 A Benchmark Model with Production Techniques Choice
The benchmark economy features a representative firm, manufacturing a product with two factor
inputs, capital and labor. Different from the neoclassical production framework, we augment raw
measures of factor inputs with production techniques that serve to organize factor inputs in an effec-
tive manner to enhance the performance of the production process. The ability to choose potentially
more profitable production techniques is subject to a technology menu available to the firm. For
the time being, we assume that there are no frictions on the availability of production techniques.
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These benchmarking assumption will be relaxed in Sections 3 to 5 below.
2.1 The Basic Environment
Denote capital as K and labor as L. The production techniques are captured by a pair (aK , aL)
which augment the two factor inputs (K,L) to govern their usage and coordinate their match. The
concept of production techniques is in line with the literature on the property of firm and aggregate
production developed by Houthakker (1955-1956), Kortum (1997) and Jones (2005). It also captures
factor-augmenting technology improvement modeled by Caselli (1999), Acemoglu (2003), and Caselli
and Coleman (2006). That is, one may rename aK and aL, respectively, as capital-augmenting and
labor-augmenting techniques. Our framework follows more closely the former literature, assuming
that the availability of techniques is subject to the following technology constraint:
H(aK , aL) = z (1)
Throughout the paper, we will assume that H(aK , aL) = aαKa
1−α
L . This technology constraint
specifies the full menu of production techniques entailing different combinations of (aK , aL) under
a given effi ciency measure z. The trade-off between the two techniques is qualitatively similar
to concept of the iso-quant, which can be referred to as the iso-tech. The firm is called more
knowledgeable in engineering the process of production if it has a higher level of z. The level of
knowledge is important for productivity measures.
We then depart from Houthakker-Kortum-Jones where a Cobb-Douglas “global” production
function can be derived as an envelope of the Leontief “local”production function with techniques
drawn from an independent Pareto distribution. We instead propose that the representative firm’s
production function takes the Constant Elasticity Substitution (CES) form:
Y = [λ(aKK)
ρ + (1− λ)(aLL)ρ]
1
ρ .
The parameter ρ ∈ (−∞, 1] captures the flexibility of the production technology in allowing the
firm to substitute between the technique-augmented factor inputs, aKK and aLL, with 1/(1 − ρ)
measuring the elasticity of substitution. The parameter λ is thus the effective capital share of pro-
duction. With (aK , aL) and the associated knowledge level z, there is no need to add another scaling
parameter to the production function.
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2.2 Firm’s Optimization
The representative firm optimizes by jointly choosing factor inputs and production techniques. Al-
though there is no particular sequencing, it is convenient to divide the production decisions into two
steps: (i) In the first step, the firm decides on capital and labor demand to achieve a given level of
output; and (ii) in the second step the firm chooses a suitable combination of production techniques
from the convex technology menu to ensure the effi ciency of the production process. While Step 1
is the standard optimization under the neoclassical production framework, Step 2 is referred to as
the techniques choice problem.
Specifically, facing the market wage and capital rental (w, r), the firm in Step 1 solves the
following cost minimization problem:
min
K,L
rK + wL (2)
s.t. [λ(aKK)
ρ + (1− λ)(aLL)ρ]
1
ρ = Y
The solution yields a unit cost function conditional on a particular pair of production techniques,
c̃(aK , aL; r, w).
In Step 2, the firm pins down techniques choice to achieve the lowest unit cost of production
under a given techniques menu:
min
aK ,aL
c̃(aK , aL; r, w) (3)
s.t. H(aK , aL) = z.
As we illustrate in Figure 1, in this model we are primarily interested in an interior solution for the
techniques choice.5 Thus, in our model economy, one may capture the concept of process innovation
by an expansion in z, which reduces the unit cost of production via more effi cient organization of
factor inputs.
In the benchmark model, the firm is allowed to choose any combination of techniques from the
menu, i.e., from a full menu. In Section 3, we will introduce technique accessibility constraints
into the benchmark and investigate the consequences of limited menu of techniques on firm-level
outcomes.
5Note that the axes in figure 1 are 1/aK and 1/aL. We adopt this convenience, so that the higher ranked isocosts
are associated with higher levels of unit cost of production.
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Neoclassical Cost Minimization
We turn now to solving the neoclassical cost-minimization problem. Throughout the paper, we shall




















Thus, the capital-labor ratio is inversely related to the factor price ratio, which is standard. How
the capital-labor ratio responds to the production technique ratio depends crucially on production
flexibility. When the two technique-augmented factor inputs are Pareto complements (ρ < 0), the
capital-labor ratio is negatively related to the production technique ratio. This is quite intuitive:
under Pareto complementarity, it is profitable to balance between the two technique-augmented
factor inputs. In this case, if the organization of factor inputs is biased towards one particular
factor, then it is expected that the firm would employ more of another factor to ensure balanced
factor usage. When the two technique-augmented factor inputs are Pareto substitutes (ρ < 0), the
opposite is true: the firm employs more of the input associated with a better technique.
The unit cost function conditional on a given pair of production techniques (aK , aL) can be
derived as:




















This equation indicates that the unit cost of production is a CES aggregator of the technique-deflated
factor costs. The endogenous adjustments in production techniques are the key to differentiate this
unit cost function from the standard neoclassical one, to which we shall turn.
Techniques Choice

















It turns out that the optimized technique ratio depends positively on the factor price ratio. Intu-
itively, when a factor input becomes pricier, it is profitable to devote more effort toward enhancing
the technique associated with that factor in order to minimize the neoclassical unit cost.











While the optimized capital-labor ratio continues to be inversely related to the factor price ratio,
the factor cost share rKwL maintains constant. The K/L ratio also depends on both the neoclassical
factor income share λ1−λ and additionally the techniques usage share
α
1−α .





























That is, both techniques are increasing in the level of knowledge. Moreover, they depend on the
factor price ratio rather than the individual factor prices. While a higher wage-rental ratio induces a
technique choice to be more biased toward labor, production flexibility affects the choice of techniques
via factor income and technique usage shares.
2.3 Unit Cost of Production
By combining the techniques choice problem with the neoclassical cost-minimization problem, we

















As we delineated before, better knowledge in techniques (higher z) engineers a process innovation,
thereby reducing the unit cost of production. Interestingly, while the conditional unit cost function is
a CES aggregator of factor prices, the final solution of the unit cost function, after taking into account
the techniques choice problem, becomes a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of factor prices weighted by
technique usage rather than factor income shares. Moreover, this Cobb-Douglas aggregator depends
on the ratios of technique usage to factor income shares, αλ and
1−α
1−λ , and production flexibility ρ.
Before elaborating the impact of production flexibility on unit cost of production, let us summarize
the firm optimization results that we obtained so far in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 (Firm Optimization) Firm’s optimizing decision possesses the following proper-
ties:
(i) While the capital-labor ratio is inversely related to the factor price ratio, a higher factor price
induces a technique choice more biased toward that factor.
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(ii) The unit cost function is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of factor prices weighted by technique
usage shares, scaled by both technique usage and factor income shares, where better knowledge
in techniques enhances the levels of techniques chosen and reduces the unit cost of production.
Proof All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Now, we turn to studying the implications of production flexibility for the cost of production.
To begin, using (10) we establish the following limit properties.






















Thus, while the factor prices are always weighted by technique usage shares, how much they affect
the unit cost depend crucially on production flexibility. When flexibility is shut down (ρ → −∞),
the production technology (the CES aggregator) precludes technique-augmented factor inputs from
substituting by each other. As a result, factor prices are deflated only by their technique usage shares.
With a greater technique usage share, a factor price would not raise the unit cost of production as
much. When flexibility is perfect, on the contrary, factor prices are deflated only by their income
shares. In this case, an increase in the price of a factor with a greater income share would become
less damaging to the unit cost of production.
With the extreme cases addressed, we now inquire what happens with intermediate levels of
flexibility.
Proposition 2.3 (Production Flexibility and Unit Cost) Production flexibility (ρ) monotonically
reduces the unit cost of production for any given pair of factor prices.
This theoretical result indicates a positive impact of production flexibility on firm performance.
This result echoes an extensive list of findings highlighted in the management science literature.6 In
the next section, we introduce frictions into our benchmark model and investigate the interactions
between production flexibility and factor-and-technique-driven distortions.
6See Roller and Tombak (1993), Gerwin (1993) and Adler, Goldoftas and Levine (1999)
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3 Production Frictions and Distortions
In this section, we incorporate production frictions into the benchmark framework and investigate
the distortionary consequences of such frictions on firm-level performance. We focus our study on
two types of frictions: (i) capital finance imperfections that result in constrained capital input, and
(ii) technique capability limitations that lead to constrained technique usage.
3.1 Capital Input Constraint
Suppose that capital input is constrained by
K ≤ K̄,
where K̄ is an upper limit due for example to a financial imperfection.7 When the capital constraint
is binding, the firm’s capital finance cost increases. This distortion can be conveniently expressed
as r(1 + η) with the wedge 1 + η capturing the additional capital distortion resulting from capital
finance imperfection.




















and the conditional unit cost of production:




















Applying comparative statics at 12 with respect to η yields the following intuitive result.
Proposition 3.1 (Input Wedge and Unit Cost) For a given pair of techniques (aK , aL), the unit
cost of production rises as the capital input wedge (η) increases.
Not surprisingly, capital distortions result in a higher capital user cost, which in turn increases
the unit cost of production.
3.2 Technique Capability Constraint





7Using our framework, one can also investigate the consequences of labor market frictions. For brevity, we omit the
discussion on labor input constraints
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where ν measures the limitation on technique choice.8 Such technique biased constraints may prevail
because of limited availability of one technique relative to another or limited ability in reorganizing
one factor relative to another. As we illustrate in Figure 2, a binding constraint implies that the
firm operates under an ineffi ciently low aK/aL ratio compared to the unconstrained optimum.
When the technique capability constraint is binding, it generates a wedge 1+φ between techniques








= (1 + φ)
∂c̃/∂aL
∂c̃/∂aK





As shown in Figure 3, a wedge 1 + φ > 1 arising from the binding accessibility constraint makes the
firm operate along a higher iso-cost curve.9 Then, with both capital and technique distortions, the



















It is interesting to observe that while the constrained technique ratio is always increasing in the
capital input wedge to accommodate rising cost of capital, the effect of the technique wedge appears
to depend crucially on the flexibility of production, which requires further investigation. First, we
would like to point out the following result concerning the relationship between ρ and φ:
Lemma 3.2 (Production Flexibility and Technique Distortions)
(i) (Pareto Complement) When ρ < 0, the technique wedge exhibits φ > 0.
(ii) (Pareto Substitute) When 0 < ρ < 1, the technique wedge exhibits −1 < φ < 0.
Consider the Pareto complement case. We can see from (13) that the technique wedge cre-
ates a distortionary margin raising the shadow cost of capital-augmenting technique relative to the
labor-augmenting technique. As this wedge rises, techniques choice is more biased toward labor-
augmenting. Now, let’s examine the Pareto substitute case. As the wedge is widened (1 + φ ap-
proaching zero), techniques choice becomes again more biased toward labor-augmenting. Thus, we
obtain the following:
Proposition 3.3 (Distortion Wedges and Techniques Choice) Either a reduced capital input wedge
(higher η) or a widened technique accessibility wedge (higher |φ|) induces technique choice to be bi-
ased toward labor-augmenting regardless of the elasticity of substitution between technique-augmented
factor inputs.
8For brevity, we omit the discussion of the alternative, aK
aL
≥ ν
9We would like to note that this wedge may be, more generally, as a result of various frictions and distortions
associated with techniques choice.
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For the rest of the analysis, we will focus on the Pareto complement case with ρ < 0 and φ > 0. In
Section 5, we will provide empirical evidence from various manufacturing industries for the estimates
of ρ and argue that for the manufacturing sector ρ < 0 is the empirically plausible portion of the
parameter space.
3.3 Distortions, Production Flexibility, and Unit Costs
We again combine the techniques choice problem with the neoclassical optimization problem to solve













Thus, the capital-labor ratio always decreases with either distortionary wedge, whether it raises the
user cost of capital or the shadow cost of capital-augmenting technique. Moreover, the levels of











































We can see that while an increase in the capital input wedge induces techniques choice to be biased
toward capital-augmenting, widening the technique capability wedge generates an opposite effect.
Intuitively, widening the technique capability wedge implies more distortions on capital-augmenting
technique relative to the labor-augmenting technique, thereby inducing a technique choice biased
toward labor-augmenting. This result is very interesting from the theoretical and —as we delineate
below —from the quantitative point of view. In order to undo the distortionary effects of the capital
wedge (η), the firm raises its “capital productivity”. However, by how much it can do this is limited
by the capital-technique wedge (φ). We summarize the impact of distortionary wedges on firms’
K − L and aK − aL decisions as the following.
Proposition 3.4 (Distortion Wedges and Firm Decisions)
(i) The capital-labor ratio decreases with either wedge.
(ii) A higher capital input wedge induces techniques choice to be biased toward capital-augmenting,
but widening the technique capability wedge generates an opposite effect.
13


























Capital wedge η clearly raises the unit cost of production. The technique wedge affects the unit cost






, which depends crucially on production flexibility. Observe
that (1+φ)
α
1+αφ is hump-shaped, reaching the minimum value of zero at φ = −1 and the maximum value
of one at φ = 0; it never exceeds one for all −1 < φ < 1. Thus, in the Pareto complement case






> 1, implying that the unit cost of production is higher in
the presence of technique distortions. Therefore, regardless of the elasticity of substitution between
technique-augmented factor inputs, increasing either the capital input wedge or the technique wedge
lead to a higher unit cost of production.
The next question to be addressed is whether the distortionary effects of the two wedges on the







∂η∂ρ , under the benchmark of Pareto complementarity with ρ < 0 and
φ > 0. In this case, we depict in Figure 4 the combinations of the pairs of wedges (η, φ) that keep
the unit cost of production constant. Since both wedges raise the unit cost, this locus is downward
sloping. While the capital input wedge raises the unit cost of production, one can see from (18)
that this wedge does not directly interact with production flexibility. Therefore, a more flexible
production technology would not help mitigate the detrimental effects of capital distortions on the
unit cost of production, i.e., ∂
2c
∂η∂ρ = 0. For the distortionary technique wedge, we can observe that
∂2c
∂φ∂ρ > 0, implying that flexibility elevates the detrimental effects of technique distortions. Thus,
when techniques choice is subject to frictions, a high production flexibility might not be as desirable
from firms’ cost effi ciency point of view. We summarize the results concerning the interactions
between distortions, production flexibility and the unit cost as the following.
Proposition 3.5 (Production Flexibility, Distortion Wedges and Unit Cost of Production)
(i) Increasing the capital input wedge or widening the technique capability wedge raises the unit cost
of production.
(ii) Production flexibility does not mitigate the detrimental effects of capital distortions on the unit
cost of production.
(iii) Under Pareto complementarity, greater flexibility of production amplifies the detrimental effects
of technique distortions.
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Finally, we also examine the interaction between capital and technique distortions. In the Pareto
complement case with ρ < 0 and φ > 0, it is clear that ∂c
2
∂η∂φ > 0, implying reinforcing cost deficiency
of η and φ wedges.
Proposition 3.6 (Interaction of Input and Technique Distortions) The detrimental effects of capital
and technique distortions on the unit cost of production are reinforcing each other.
This result is very important for the quantitative implications of distortions on economic per-
formance. In particular, it suggests that factor input distortions become more harmful for the
performance of the firm when the access to production techniques is limited.
4 Firm Dynamics, Production and Misallocation
The theoretical analysis so far taught us that both capital financing and technique accessibility
frictions would raise the unit cost of production. In order to investigate the aggregate implications
of each type of friction, we consider a heterogeneous firms set-up, where we allow firms to differ in
their productivities as well as in the distortions they face due to the two types of frictions. We model
the dynamic firm entry-exit following the seminal work by Melitz (2003). In so doing, we are able to
isolate the effects of input and technique distortions on extensive and intensive margin misallocation.
Building upon our theoretical aggregation results, we will develop industry-level aggregate TFP
measures and decompose the TFP effects of capital-and-technique-generated misallocation.
4.1 Entry
There is a distribution of firms, which can produce a particular manufacturing industry’s output.
We assume that in order to enter the industry, each firm must pay fe, as a fixed entry cost -
measured in units of labor. Upon entry, in order to produce a firm needs to incur f units of fixed
production costs. In addition to this, each firm will pay the operation cost cy, where c is the unit
cost of production. The unit cost of production will endogenously vary across firms depending on
the firm-specific variations in technology scale, capital and technique distortions, namely in {z, η, φ}.
4.2 Demand






(σ − 1)−1c(r, w)1−σI,
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where σ/(σ − 1) —with σ > 1 —is the mark-up implied by Dixit-Stiglitz preferences and I is the
aggregate income in the society which we treat as exogenous. Then, the larger φ and η the smaller are
firm profits due to higher unit cost of production. Recall that, via the unit cost function, production
flexibility ρ does not influence the effect of η on firm profits, but it amplifies the distortionary effects
of φ on firm profits.
4.3 Heterogeneity
We analyze the effects of {z, η, φ} on firms’entry-exit (extensive margin) and their production scale
(intensive margin). In particular, we need to characterize the cutoffs that govern firms’entry-exit
decisions and study the impact of production flexibility on firm dynamics. For illustrative purposes,
we shall loosely refer to z, η and φ as the productivity shock, the capital financing shock and the
technique capability shock respectively. The productivity shock (z) is standard, which is assumed to
follow a Pareto distribution. The capital financing shock (η) is similar to Hsieh and Klenow’s capital
wedge τk, which is assumed to follow a log normal distribution. The technique capability shock (φ)
is a novel contribution of our framework, which is also assumed to follow a log normal distribution.
The timing of events that we consider is given as follows:
1. Firms pay fe to enter, where entry decision depends on expected profits.
2. All shocks are realized.
3. Firms’production and exit decisions depend on realized profits.
(a) If realized profits are too low, firms exit immediately without engaging in production.
(b) If realized profits are high enough, firms pay fixed cost f and produce at unit cost c(r, w).
Similar to Melitz (2003), entry is pinned down when a firm’s expected profit is equal to the entry cost
fe. Since all shocks are realized upon entry, firms are ex ante identical when it comes to expected
profits and the decision to enter the industry. Exit and production scale decisions, however, exhibit
heterogeneity across firms —to generate misallocation at extensive and intensive margins.
In order to establish some theoretical properties, let us consider one idiosyncratic shock at a
time. That is, when we consider a particular shock, the other two are known ex ante and assumed
to be homogeneous among all firms.
Consider, say, the productivity shock. It is straightforward to show that there is a cutoff produc-
tivity level z∗ determining the threshold level of z at which a firm is indifferent between to-produce
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and not-to-produce: f = π(z∗). Similar cutoffs apply to the capital financing shock (η∗) and the
technique capability shock (φ∗). We can establish:
Proposition 4.1 (Firm Heterogeneity and Entry)
(i) Each shock can affect both the allocation of production factors (intensive margin) and the pro-
duction/exit decisions (extensive margin).
(ii) While production flexibility only matters for the extensive margin in the presence of productivity
or capital financing shock, it matters for both intensive and extensive margin in the presence
of the technique capability shock.
This important theoretical result illustrates that the production flexibility kicks in and has an
heterogeneous impact through the intensive margin misallocation driven by input-and-technique
oriented frictions. Therefore, in our quantitative analysis we focus on intensive margin misallocation
and the quantitative relevance of flexibility in mitigating technique distortions. Before turning to
the quantitative exercises, in the next section we develop methods to measure firm-level revenue and
physical productivity, which we will utilize in isolating the impacts of input-and-technique-driven
distortions on intensive margin misallocation and in turn on manufacturing TFPs.
4.4 Firm-level Revenue Productivity: TFPR
In this section, we study firms’allocations, marginal revenue products and derive proxies to measure
the intensive margin misallocation of resources across firms implied by the two distortionary wedges.
As we delineated above, we continue to focus on the Pareto complement case with ρ < 0 and φ > 0.
4.4.1 Misallocation of Capital
Let (1+ηi) denote firm i’s capital financing wedge, and suppose that φi = 0 for all i. This means the
capital wedges faced by different firms in an industry are allowed to vary, capturing the misallocation







which is identical to one in Hsieh and Klenow (2009).10 Therefore, the misallocation resulting from
capital distortions can be can be directly compared to Hsieh and Klenow.
10Hsieh and Klenow utilize this K/L ratio equation to back firm specific η’s (τK’s in their model)
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With Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, the revenue function is given by Y
σ−1
σ
i where Yi is the output
produced by firm i and σ is the elasticity of substitution across producers. We can derive the
marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK) as the following:
MRPKi ∝ (1 + ηi)1−ρ(1−α),
which differs from the formulation in Hsieh and Klenow given by MRPKHKi ∝ 1 + ηi. It is
clear that with ρ = 0 our MRPK measure collapses to MRPKHK . In general, under the Pareto
complement benchmark, the exponent 1− ρ(1− α) exceeds one, implying that our MRPK measure
is more responsive to capital distortions. Moreover, the higher production flexibility is, the less
responsive a firm’s marginal revenue product of capital is to such distortions. Intuitively, a firm
with a distortionary capital wedge can potentially raise its capital technique aK to mitigate the
detrimental effect of capital distortions. By how much a firm can exercise this depends on production
flexibility. With greater flexibility (ρ closer to zero), the detrimental effect is more easily mitigated,
thereby requiring lower revenue productivity to achieve the given level of output. As a result, the
MRPK dispersion among firms facing heterogeneous capital financing shocks is lower. This result is
crucial for measuring the TFP losses due to misallocation of capital and labor, because the dispersion
in MRPKs across firms can generate aggregate TFP losses as pointed out by Hsieh and Klenow.
Similarly, we can derive:
MRPLi ∝ (1 + ηi)ρα.
In contrast to Hsieh and Klenow where the marginal revenue product of labor is independent of
capital distortions, our model suggests that, in the Pareto complement benchmark, capital distortions
can result in lower MRPL due to endogenous techniques choice. While greater production flexibility
requires higher labor revenue productivity to achieve the given level of output, the MRPL dispersion
across firms is lower.
Aggregating MRPK and MRPL at the firm-level, we can apply (18) to obtain the firm-specific
total factor revenue productivity:
TFPRi ∝ (1 + ηi)α,
which is increasing in the severity of capital distortion but such a detrimental effect is independent
of ρ.
Proposition 4.2 (Capital Distortions and Misallocation and TFPR) The effects of capital distor-
tions on the firm-level TFPR and the dispersion of TFPRs are independent of production flexibility.
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4.4.2 Misallocation of Techniques
Denote firm i’s technique capability wedge by (1 + φi) and suppose that ηi = 0 for all i. The wedges
faced by different firms in an industry are also allowed to differ - capturing the misallocation of














These together with the property of ∂
2c
∂φ∂ρ > 0 enable us to establish:
Proposition 4.3 (Technique Distortions and Misallocation, Production Flexibility and TFPR) The
effects of technique distortions on the firm-level TFPR and the dispersion of TFPRs are elevated by
production flexibility.
Dispersions in TFPR will enable us to evaluate the intensive margin misallocation generated
by η and φ and its impact on aggregate TFP - as it’s standard in the literature. However, in our
framework η and φ distortions influence the aggregate TFP through firms’physical productivity
(TFPQ) as well, which we shall turn next.
4.5 Firm-level Physical Productivity: TFPQ
Different from the standard neoclassical analysis, in our framework the capital and technique oriented
distortions affect the physical productivity of the firm via techniques choice. Following Foster,
Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) we call physical productivity as the Total Factor Productivity
in Quality (TFPQ) and investigate the impact of the interactions between techniques choice and
production distortions on TFPQ.
4.5.1 Intensive Margin TFPQ Gap
In our framework, idiosyncratic capital distortions are alleviated by endogenous technique adjust-
ments. Endogenous techniques selection, in turn, implies TFPQ differences across firms. In order to
illustrate this TFP differential, let (K̂, L̂) be the factor demands by a firm A that chooses techniques
(âK , âL) in the absence of capital distortions (η = 0). Let (K∗, L∗) and (a∗K , a
∗
L) be the solution to
the firm B that faces a capital distortion of η > 0. Firms A and B are identical otherwise. Since
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∗)ρ + (1− λ)(a∗LL∗)ρ]
1
ρ .
The question we need to answer is: Given (a∗K , a
∗
L), what would be the output of the ini-
tially capital constrained firm B if it were to produce by employing factor inputs (K̂, L̂) instead
of (K∗, L∗)? If there were no techniques choice as in the standard neoclassical production frame-
work, then we would have had YA(K̂, L̂) = YB(K̂, L̂). With techniques choice, we clearly have
YA(K̂, L̂) > YB(K̂, L̂). We shall say such intensive margin physical productivity gap is present be-
cause the ratio TFPQint(K̂, L̂) ≡ YB(K̂,L̂)YA(K̂,L̂) falls below one. We denote such TFPQ differential as
the intensive margin TFPQ-gap, because they are driven by the intensive margin capital dispersion
- and not by some intrinsic productivity differences, such as the heterogeneity in firms’knowledge
scale.z.
Lemma 4.4 (Capital Distortions and TFPQint) The intensive margin dispersion in capital distor-
tions causes an intensive margin spread in TFPQs across manufacturers (defined as TFPQint). The
higher the capital dispersion between any two firms the lower is the TFPQint differential between
them.
We would like to note that this intensive margin productivity gap is largely ignored in the
standard neoclassical production framework. Therefore, standard capital misallocation exercises
tend to over-state the TFP gains from reallocating capital. We will address this issue in Section 5
when we conduct quantitative policy exercises.
The next question we would like to address is: What is the implication of production flexibility
for the intensive margin TFPQ differences - arising from capital misallocation? Now, using (16) and





= (1 + η)−α
[











(1 + η)ρ̄χK + χL
]
− log [χK + χL]
}
=
(1 + η)ρ̄−1χK + χL
(1 + η)ρ̄χK + χL
.
It is easy to show that ρ̄ > 0. We then establish the following property regarding the impact of
production flexibility on intensive margin TFPQ gap.
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Lemma 4.5 For all ρ < ρ̄, dTFPQint(K̂,L̂)dρ > 0.
Then, the following proposition follows immediately.
Proposition 4.6 (Production Flexibility and the Intensive Margin TFPQ Effect of Capital Dis-
tortions) For the Pareto complement case we are interested in (with ρ < 0), production flexibility
mitigates the intensive margin TFPQ losses resulting from capital distortions.
4.5.2 Extensive Margin TFPQ Gap
As an alternative, next we study a TFPQ gap between a firm which can adjust the techniques and
another firm which cannot (the standard neoclassical cost minimizer) to understand the extensive
margin TFPQ gap induced by fully constrained technique choice. In the absence of techniques
choice, we simply set, for comparison purposes, aK = aL = z. Thus, we can write the firm with a
neoclassical production as:
Yneo = [λ(zK)
ρ + (1− λ)(zL)ρ]
1
ρ
= z [λKρ + (1− λ)Lρ]
1
ρ .











1+φ . The following lemmas and propositions as well as Figure 5 characterize
TFPQext over KL ∈ [0,∞).
Lemma 4.7 (Extensive Margin TFPQ)
(i) When κ > 1, TFPQext increases in K/L for all K/L ∈ [1, κ], with limK
L




(ii) When κ < 1, TFPQext decreases in K/L for all K/L ∈ [κ, 1], with limK
L




Lemma 4.8 (Extensive Margin TFPQ and Distortionary Wedges)
(i) When κ > 1, max TFPQext − min TFPQext is decreasing in η but increasing in φ for all
K/L ∈ [0,∞).
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(ii) When κ < 1, max TFPQext − min TFPQext is increasing in η but decreasing in φ for all
K/L ∈ [0,∞).
We next examine the effect of capital financing distortions on the extensive margin TFPQ gap
locally around K/L = κ, that is, evaluating the sign of ∂TFPQext∂η |KL =κ.
Proposition 4.9 (Capital Distortions and Misallocation and Extensive Margin TFPQ) For κ >
1, techniques choice amplifies the detrimental effect of capital distortions on physical productivity
relative to the neoclassical benchmark (i.e., ∂TFPQext∂η |KL =κ < 0). For κ < 1, it dampens such a
detrimental effect (∂TFPQext∂η |KL =κ > 0).
We are also interested how production flexibility influences the TFPQext - again around K/L =
κ. Define θK ≡ λKρ and θL ≡ (1 − λ)Lρ, ϕK ≡ aKz (1 + η)
α−1 and ϕL ≡ aLz (1 + η)
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(1 + η)ρ̃ϕKθK + ϕLθL
]
− log [θK + θL]
}
=
(1 + η)ρ̃−1ϕKθK + ϕLθL
(1 + η)ρ̃ϕKθK + ϕLθL
.
We then obtain:
Lemma 4.10 (Extensive Margin TFPQ) For all ρ < ρ̃, dTFPQext(K̂,L̂)dρ < 0.
Again, since ρ̃ > 0, the following result is immediate.
Proposition 4.11 (Technique Distortions and Misallocation, Production Flexibility and Extensive
Margin TFPQ) For the Pareto complement case we are interested in (with ρ < 0), production
flexibility reduces extensive margin effect of techniques choice on TFPQ relative to the neoclassical
benchmark.
5 Quantitative Analysis
We have established several important properties of a generalized production framework with endoge-
nous techniques choice in an economy with frictions. We are now prepared to utilize firm-level data
from Compustat North America database to conduct quantitative exercises to illustrate the effects
of misallocation of capital and misallocation of techniques on aggregate industry TFP. Specifically,
we express the variance in aggregate-industry TFPR —a measure of intensive margin misallocation,
compute firm-level TFPQ and calibrate the aggregate industry TFP.
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5.1 Data
We use firm-level balance sheet data from Compustat’s Industrial database in 2005. Our industry-
level exercises focus on 4-digit SIC manufacturing industry clusters that we list in Table 1.
The key firm-level variables that we need for the quantitative analysis are annual figures for
capital and labor costs, employment, capital stock and sales, which we proxy by firm’s Capital
Expenditures, Compensation of Employees, Number of Employees, Stock of Plant-Property-and-
Equipment, and Value of Sales.
The quantitative analysis also requires values for industry-level structural parameters, namely,
the capital share of income in production (λs), the capital’s technique share in the technology menu
(αs), and finally the flexibility of the production technology (ρs), where s denotes a manufacturing
industry from the groups of industries we list in Table 1. We utilize U.S. industry aggregate data to
calibrate the industry level structural parameters λs and αs and adopt the existing U.S. industry-
level measures for ρs.













We assume that, at the aggregate industry level, the capital distortions and technique adjustment
frictions wash out, that is, the industry averages of ηsi and φsi across all i in any s satisfy:
ηsi = φsi = 0. (22)
Then, using (21) and (22) and industry averages of capital expenditures, (Ksir(1 + ηsi)(1 + φsi)),




Ksir(1 + ηsi)(1 + φsi)
Lsiwsi
. (23)
We next compute the industry labor share in production, 1 − λs, utilizing the labor share of U.S.
manufacturing plants obtained from NBER-CES Manufacturing Database. This database contains
all manufacturing industries for the years in between 1958-2005 at 4-digit SIC level and provides the
labor compensation and value added for each industry, which allow us to compute industry level 1−
λs. With this, we then apply (23) to back out industry level capital share in the technology menu, αs.
Finally, we use industry-level capital-labor elasticity for the U.S. economy from Oberfield and Raval
(2012) to proxy our production flexibility parameter ρs, in which ρs < 0 holds for all manufacturing
industries, implying Pareto complementarity. Table 2 presents the benchmark structural parameters
for U.S. manufacturing industries.
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We now evaluate the equation (21) at the firm-level in order to back-out firm-specific φsi. Specif-
ically, by taking the fraction αsλs(1−αs)(1−λs) , firm specific capital expenditures Ksir(1 + ηsi), and com-
pensation of employees Lsiwsi as given, we back out firm specific technique wedge as:






In order to extract the firms’factor distortions, ηsi, we compute the average price of capital in each
industry, r̄s as the ratio between firms’average capital expenditures and the average property, plant
and equipment stock. We then derive the firm-specific capital wedge:




where rsi is the ratio between a particular firm’s capital expenditures and the stock of property,
plant and equipment. Table 3 also presents the values of r̄s across industries in our sample.
5.2 Capital and Technique Misallocation and TFPR Dispersion
Recall that TFPR is an indicator of the intensive margin distortion at the firm-level, which in
aggregation exercises measures the misallocation of capital, as shown by Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
While quantifying this measure of TFP losses, we will provide a variance decomposition exercise
toward understanding the sources of intra-industry TFPR dispersion. In order to fully understand
the quantitative consequences of technique capability, we derive the TFPR dispersion in relation to
the misallocation of capital as well as to the misallocation of techniques. To highlight our results,
we also consider a standard neoclassical framework with Cobb-Douglas production technology —a
special case with ρs = 1 for every industry s —as assumed in Hsieh and Klenow.
In an environment with capital and technique distortions, we can rewrite the TFPR derived
above for firm i in industry s as:




























If η and φ are independently and identically distributed across firms in a given industry, then
with adjustable techniques the intra-industry variance of TFPR can be derived as:
var(lnTFPRsi) = α
2















This expression reveals that a rise in the production flexibility ρ widens the intra-industry TFPR




which holds under ρ < 0. As we noted in Table 2, this is the empirically plausible case for the broad
range of manufacturing industries that we consider. Table 3b documents the TFPR dispersion in
each industry by decomposing the TFPR dispersion into (i) the variances in capital distortions (η)
and (ii) the variances in technique capability distortions (φ). While the former measures capital
misallocation, the latter reflects technique misallocation.
There are two important findings to highlight. First, with techniques choice, production flexibility
is found to amplify the contribution of technique misallocation to the dispersion in TFPR. Second,
as a result of the aforementioned amplification effect, technique misallocation turns out to explain
a larger fraction of the TFPR dispersion than capital misallocation, across all industries in our
sample. Specifically, as can be observed in Table 3, capital misallocation captured by the variance of







industries, but the latter is amplified by the production flexibility parameter ρs, thereby leading to
a greater contribution to the TFPR variance. That is, with the amplification effect of production
flexibility, technique misallocation becomes more important for the TFPR dispersion compared to
the capital misallocation in manufacturing industry clusters.
For comparison purposes, we also quantify the TFPR dispersion under the standard Cobb-









1 + τ si
,
and the TFPR can be expressed as:
lnTFPRsi ∝ λs[ln(1 + ηsi) + ln(1 + τ si)],
where τ si is the residual firm specific distortions, which could be classified as output distortions or
labor input distortions. We thus have:
var(lnTFPRsi) = λ
2
s [var(ln(1 + ηsi)) + var(ln(1 + τ si))] . (25)
In contrast to our formula (24), the coeffi cient associated with the capital input distortion is λs —the
capital share in industry s’s output. Table 4a presents the variances of ln(1 + ηsi) and ln(1 + τ si),
whereas Table 4b decomposes the the TFPR dispersion into variances in (i) capital input distortions
(η) and (ii) residual distortions (τ), where the former captures capital misallocation.
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It is clear that, with the Cobb-Douglas specification in the absence of techniques choice, the mis-
allocation of capital has a quantitatively large contribution to the TFPR dispersion —as emphasized
by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and many other studies.
5.3 Industry TFP
We next turn to computing the physical productivity of the firm, the TFPQ. Again, we rewrite it















where ξtechs is an industry scaling factor. Since aKi/zsi and aLi/zsi are functions of ηsi and φsi,
TFPR and TFPQ might exhibit a systematic covariance as we delineated in Section 4.5 because of
intensive margin TFPQ adjustment resulting from endogenous techniques selection. The endogenous
component of the covariance between TFPQ and TFPR is quite crucial for assessing the impact of
factor misallocation on aggregate industry total factor productivity. Specifically, if firms with low
levels of physical productivity are hit with larger capital distortions, the aggregate TFP effects of
misallocation would be smaller.11 Under the Cobb-Douglas production technology in the absence of











which is independent of the capital input distortion, as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
As shown in Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) as well as in Hsieh and Klenow, one
may compute industry-level aggregate TFP using the information of firms’TFPRs and TFPQs. We
follow this line of methodology, assuming that TFPQ and TFPR are jointly drawn from a log-normal












[var(lnTFPQsi)− var(lnTFPRsi)− 2cov(lnTFPQsi, lnTFPRsi)] ,(27)
where we set σ equal to 3 as in Hsieh and Klenow. We would like to note that this TFP expression
is a generalized TFP formula stemming from the Hsieh and Klenow framework. The generalization
is that it allows for a covariance between TFPQ and TFPR, which is of particular importance for
11Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Buera et al. (2013)
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our analysis. Under the Cobb-Douglas production technology in the absence of techniques choice,













For our general production framework with techniques choice, the contribution of capital input
and technique distortions to industry TFP depend crucially on the endogenous component of the
covariance between TFPQ and TFPR.
We conduct counterfactual exercises by collapsing either capital or technique distortions (ηsi or
φsi) to zero for every firm in an industry s, thus removing the misallocation of capital or techniques,
respectively. We find that either would decrease the TFPR dispersion and reduce the negative
covariance between TFPQ and TFPR. While the former effect is desirable for raising the industry
TFP, the latter is not as we delineated in Section 4.5. Our counterfactual exercises also indicate
that elimination of either type of misallocation would have an impact on the average TFPQ as
well. The TFPQ effect might result with an increase as well as a decrease in average lnTFPQ —
depending on whether the average firm in the industry was being “taxed” or “subsidized” with
its idiosyncratic distortion. For the case of Cobb-Douglas production without techniques choice,
counterfactual analysis shows that, as expected with the formula above, setting ηsi to zero for all
firm will only affect the TFPR variance. Tables 5-7 present the results from our industry TFP
exercises.
Table 5a presents the baseline TFP calibration under our generalized production framework.
There are two features that we would like to highlight. With the exception of the Paper & Printing
industry in all manufacturing industries, the TFPR dispersion is substantially large ranging from
0.23 to 1.72 and averaging around 0.8. Furthermore, except for the Food & Tobacco industry, the
covariance between TFPQ and TFPR is negative (averaging around -0.14) —a key quantitative result
that is expected to be produced under our generalized production framework. Table 5b provides the
comparable TFP measures for the case of Cobb-Douglas production without techniques choice.
Table 6 presents the counterfactual results by setting capital input distortions to zero for all
firms in each industry s. With endogenous techniques choice, its affect on the TFP turns out to be
quantitatively small. This is because that the benefits from reducing TFPR dispersion by removing
capital misallocation is counteracted by the reductions in the negative covariance between TFPQ
and TFPR. We also note that the value of average lnTFPQ does not change by a significant margin.
On the contrary, with the standard Cobb-Douglas production without techniques choice, eliminating
capital misallocation has a quantitatively large aggregate TFP effect in every industry.
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Table 7 summarizes the counterfactual results for removing technique misallocation by setting
technique distortions to zero for all firms in each industry s. As we already noted in the previous
subsection, technique misallocation contributes to a large fraction of the TFPR variance across firms.
Therefore, eliminating this type of misallocation lowers the TFPR dispersion sharply and increases
the TFP substantively while the reductions in the negative covariance between TFPQ and TFPR
does not counteract this with the exception of the Paper & Printing and Metal Manufacturing
industries.
Another important result to note is that reducing the TFPR dispersion caused by technique
misallocation has the highest impact in industries with highest degrees of production flexibility. For
instance, Food & Tobacco and Transportation Equipment industries, which have the highest level
of production flexibility in our sample of industries, reducing TFPR dispersion due to technique
misallocation lead to quantitatively the highest amounts of TFP gains. On the contrary, Primary &
Fabricated Metal Manufacturing is one with the least production flexibility; technique misallocation
also turn out to be the least important for the aggregate TFP of this industry. These results are
aligned with our theoretical predictions concerning the interactions between production flexibility
and technique distortions.
5.4 Summary of Quantitative Results
Combining the quantitative results in the two previous subsections, we can conclude the following:
1. More than 50% of the intra-industry TFPR dispersion is accounted by misallocation of tech-
niques among firms. This observation consistently prevails in all manufacturing industries in
the sample.
2. The relative importance of technique misallocation in explaining the dispersion of the TFPR,
compared to capital misallocation, is largely driven by the magnitude of industry produc-
tion flexibility. Reducing the TFPR dispersion caused by technique misallocation has greater
impact in industries with higher degrees of production flexibility.
3. The effects of capital misallocation on the TFPQ and as a result on the covariance between
TFPQ and TFPR are quite essential in understanding the consequences of capital misallocation
for the aggregate industry TFP.
4. In the standard neoclassical framework without techniques choice, the misallocation of capital
remains to have a quantitatively large impact for the aggregate industry TFP.
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6 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a generalized production framework, incorporating the concept of design for
manufacturability where firms decide on their factor inputs as well as production techniques that
govern the effi cient use of factors under currently operating technologies. We have characterized
factor demands, techniques choice and the unit cost of production and examined the role of produc-
tion flexibility. By allowing firms to differ in technology scales and capital financing and technique
capability constraints, we have modeled firm entry-exit and aggregated heterogeneous firms in each
industry to produce an industry TFP measure. We have then examined the consequences of capital
and technique misallocation for aggregate productivity as well as the interplay of the TFP effects
of misallocation with production flexibility. While both capital financing and technique capability
distortions raise the unit cost of production, production flexibility reduces it. The detrimental ef-
fects of capital financing distortions is independent of the extent of production flexibility, but the
detrimental effects of technique capability distortions is amplified by production flexibility.
We have undertaken a number of quantitative exercises by calibrating our model to fit the
observations from firm-level data in U.S. manufacturing industries. Our quantitative results suggest
the following. Due to an amplification effect of production flexibility, technique misallocation yields
larger TFP losses than capital misallocation. This means, TFP gains from removing technique
misallocation are larger in industries with more flexible production. Once techniques choice is absent
and production takes the Cobb-Douglas form, the importance of capital misallocation for aggregate
productivity stands out.
An important policy implication arising from our analysis is that to achieve greater production
effi ciency, mitigating technique misallocation should be granted with higher priority than reducing
capital misallocation. This is of particular importance in industries with higher degrees of production
flexibility, such as Food & Tobacco and Transportation Equipment industries —which are not typical
candidates for industry policy considerations in the development literature. Such policy arrangement
may include, but not limited to, tax incentives for adjusting production techniques and subsidies to
design for manufacturability, both on equal ground for all firms in the same industry.
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Table 1. Classification of Manufacturing Industries








Table 2. Structural Parameters
Industry Cluster α λ ρ Effective Capital Share
with Adjustable Techniques
Food-Tobacco 0.13 0.72 -0.15 0.38
Paper-Printing 0.14 0.62 -1.85 0.27
Chemichal-Petrol-Rubber/Plastic 0.14 0.72 -1.05 0.42
Primary/Fabricated Metal 0.25 0.55 -2.85 0.41
Machinery 0.17 0.54 -0.92 0.24
Electrical Equipment 0.22 0.57 -0.96 0.37
Transportation Equipment 0.17 0.55 -0.90 0.25
Elasticity of capital in technology menu, α, is calibrated. The income share of capital in CES production
function, λ, is calibrated using labor share of U.S. manufacturing plants from NBER-CES Manufacturing
Database. The production flexibility, ρ, is from Oberfield and Raval (2012). The effective capital share is








Table 3a. Manufacturing Distortions (Production with Technique Choice)






) r̄s # of Observations
Food-Tobacco 0.874 0.125 0.13 172
Paper-Printing 0.776 0.037 0.12 142
Chemichal-Petrol-Rubber/Plastic 1.134 0.463 0.17 882
Primary/Fabricated Metal 0.827 0.165 0.11 177
Machinery 1.017 0.097 0.18 352
Electrical Equipment 1.010 0.286 0.17 601
Transportation Equipment 0.798 0.443 0.12 162
ηsi and φsi are the firm-level factor and technique adjustment distortions respectively. r̄s is the industry-level
cost of borrowing averaged over all firms in an industry s.
Table 3b. TFPR Dispersion (Production with Technique Choice)
Industry Cluster Var(lnTFPR) Contr. η-Var (%) Contr. φ-Var (%) ρ
Food-Tobacco 1.449 1.3 98.7 -0.15
Paper-Printing 0.061 79 21 -1.85
Chemichal-Petrol-Rubber/Plastic 0.832 3 97 -1.05
Primary/Fabricated Metal 0.361 46 54 -2.85
Machinery 0.070 42 58 -0.92
Electrical Equipment 0.968 13 87 -0.96
Transportation Equipment 1.718 0.5 99.5 -0.90











. Contributions are the percentages of the
lnTFPR variance explained by η and φ heterogeneity across firms.
33
Table 4a. Manufacturing Distortions (Neoclassical Production)
Industry Cluster St. Dev(ln(1 + ηsi)) St. Dev(ln(1 + τsi)) r̄s # of Observations
Food-Tobacco 0.874 1.149 0.13 172
Paper-Printing 0.776 1.024 0.12 142
Chemichal-Petrol-Rubber/Plastic 1.134 1.668 0.17 882
Primary/Fabricated Metal 0.827 1.277 0.11 177
Machinery 1.017 1.515 0.18 352
Electrical Equipment 1.010 1.640 0.17 601
Transportation Equipment 0.798 1.242 0.12 162
ηsi is the firm-level factor distortion and τsi is the residual distortion. r̄s is the industry-level cost of borrowing
averaged over all firms in an industry s.
Table 4b. TFPR Dispersion (Neoclassical Production)
Industry Cluster Var(lnTFPR) Contr. η-Var (%) Contr. τ -Var (%)
Food-Tobacco 0.013 42.4 57.7
Paper-Printing 0.010 50.1 49.9
Chemichal-Petrol-Rubber/Plastic 0.037 39.1 60.9
Primary/Fabricated Metal 0.077 42.4 57.6
Machinery 0.127 43.6 56.4
Electrical Equipment 0.414 35.8 64.2
Transportation Equipment 0.044 41.7 58.3
lnTFPRsi is proportional to λ ln(1 + ηsi) + λ ln(1 + τsi). Contributions are the percentages of the lnTFPR
variance explained by η and τ heterogeneity across firms.
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Table 5a. Baseline TFP (Production with Technique Choice)
Industry Cluster lnTFP Mean(lnTFPQ) Var(lnTFPQ) Var(lnTFPR) 2×Cov(.,.) ρ
+ + - -
Food-Tobacco 1.24 2.53 0.17 1.45 0.02 -0.15
Paper-Printing 1.93 1.87 0.07 0.06 -0.05 -1.85
Chem.-Pet.-Plastic 1.66 1.91 0.38 0.83 -0.19 -1.05
Metal 1.94 1.91 0.12 0.23 -0.14 -2.85
Machinery 1.72 1.76 0.19 0.36 -0.13 -0.92
Electrical Equ. 1.32 1.79 0.25 0.97 -0.25 -0.96























+ σ−12 [var(lnTFPQsi) − var(lnTFPRsi) − 2cov(lnTFPQsi, lnTFPRsi)],
Cov(., .) ≡ Cov(lnTFPQ, lnTFPR).
Table 5b. Baseline TFP (Neoclassical Production)
Industry Cluster lnTFP Mean(lnTFPQ) Var(lnTFPQ) Var(lnTFPR)
+ + -
Food-Tobacco 2.42 2.02 0.42 0.01
Paper-Printing 2.27 2.05 0.23 0.009
Chem.-Pet.-Plastic 2.34 1.33 1.05 0.04
Metal 2.33 2.15 0.25 0.08
Machinery 2.36 2.06 0.43 0.13
Electrical Equ. 1.89 1.92 0.38 0.41

















+ σ−12 [var(lnTFPQsi) − var(lnTFPRsi)]
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Table 6a. The Effects of Collapsing to ηsi = 0 for all firm i in sector s (Prod. with Tech. Choice)
% pts. % pts. % pts. % pts.
% ∆ in cont. of ∆ in cont. of ∆ in cont. of ∆ in cont. of ∆ in
Industry Cluster lnTFP Mean(lnTFPQ) Var(lnTFPQ) Var(lnTFPR) 2×Cov(.,.) ρ
Food-Tobacco + 7.8 % - 0.2 + 0.3 + 9.3 -1.4 -0.15
Paper-Printing - 3.4 % - 1.7 -0.05 + 1.3 -2.5 -1.85
Chem.-Pet.-Plastic - 7.6 % -2.3 + 0.2 + 5.8 - 11.3 -1.05
Metal - 1.6 % - 3.2 - 0.5 + 7.1 - 5.0 -2.85
Machinery - 6.6 % - 1.7 - 0.2 + 2.6 - 7.3 -0.92
Electrical Equ. + 3.2 % - 2.1 - 1.0 + 14.5 - 8.1 -0.96
Transport. Equ. - 0.6 % - 1.9 - 0.02 + 16.3 - 14.8 -0.90
% ∆ in lnTFP is the percentage change in lnTFP following a hypothetical exercise that collapses the factor
friction, ηsi, to zero for every firm i in the industry s. % pts. cont. is the percentage points contribution of a
particular TFP component to the change in lnTFP. Cov(., .) ≡ Cov(lnTFPQ, lnTFPR).
Table 6b. The Effects of Collapsing to ηsi = 0 for all firm i in sector s (Neoclassical Production)
% pts. % pts. % pts.
% ∆ in cont. of ∆ in cont. of ∆ in cont. of ∆ in
Industry Cluster lnTFP Mean(lnTFPQ) Var(lnTFPQ) Var(lnTFPR)
Food-Tobacco + 9.7 % 0 0 +9.7
Paper-Printing + 1.8 % 0 0 + 1.8
Chem.-Pet.-Plastic + 6.5 % 0 0 + 6.5
Metal + 8.9 % 0 0 + 8.9
Machinery +3.1 % 0 0 + 3.1
Electrical Equ. + 15.3 % 0 0 + 15.3
Transport. Equ. + 17.1 % 0 0 +17.1
% ∆ in lnTFP is the percentage change in lnTFP following a hypothetical exercise that collapses the factor
friction, ηsi, to zero for every firm i in the industry s. % pts. cont. is the percentage points contribution of a
particular TFP component to the change in lnTFP.
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Table 7. The Effects of Collapsing to φsi = 0 for all firm i in sector s (Prod. with Tech. Choice)
% pts. % pts. % pts. % pts.
% ∆ in cont. of ∆ in cont. of ∆ in cont. of ∆ in cont. of ∆ in
Industry Cluster lnTFP Mean(lnTFPQ) Var(lnTFPQ) Var(lnTFPR) 2×Cov(.,.) ρ
Food-Tobacco + 112.3 % - 5.1 + 1.0 + 114.6 + 1.8 -0.15
Paper-Printing - 3.4 % - 3.3 - 0.3 + 2.4 - 2.2 -1.85
Chem.-Pet.-Plastic + 32.3 % - 6.4 + 2.3 + 48.8 - 12.3 -1.05
Metal - 7.6 % - 7.0 - 1.1 + 6.7 - 6.2 -2.85
Machinery + 9.6 % - 6.3 + 1.1 + 18.6 - 3.8 -0.92
Electrical Equ. + 31.7 % - 12.3 - 0.9 + 62.9 - 18.0 -0.96
Transport. Equ. + 135.4 % - 11.5 + 6.6 + 161.3 - 21.0 -0.90
% ∆ in lnTFP is the percentage change in lnTFP following a hypothetical exercise that collapses the technique
adjustment friction, φsi, to zero for every firm i in the industry s. % pts. cont. is the percentage points
contribution of a particular TFP component to the change in lnTFP. Cov(., .) ≡ Cov(lnTFPQ, lnTFPR).
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Figure 1: Technique Optimizing Problem
  
 









































Figure 2: Technique Accesibility Constraint
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Figure 3: Technique Optimizing Problem: Constrained vs. Unconstrained Solution
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Appendix
(Not Intended for Publication)
In this Appendix, we provide detailed mathematical derivations and proofs of various Lemmas
and Propositions.
Benchmark Step-1 Solution: The Cost Minimizing K − L
The first-step is the standard neoclassical cost minimization problem presented at (2). Denoting the
Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint by µ1, solving for µ1 will provide the marginal cost
of producing one extra unit of output. First order conditions with respect to K and L are derived
as the following:






































Putting (28) and (29) together yields to the K/L ratio at (4). Plugging K and L from (28) and (29)
into the constraint at (2) and solving for µ1 provides the unit cost of production that we presented
at (5).
Benchmark Step-2 Solution: The optimized aK-aL
The second-step cost minimization problem is stated at (3). Denoting the lagrange multiplier as-





























































= µ2(1− α)aαKa−αL .(31)
Solving (30) and (31) together provide us with the optimized aK/aL ratio at (6). Plugging (6)
in (4) solves for the optimized K/L ratio as a function of model parameters α and λ; and factor
prices r and w as we expressed at (7). In order to determine the levels of aK and aL as functions of
z, w/r, α and ρ, we plug (6) in H(aK , aL) and obtain the expressions at (8) and (9). Plugging aK


















Finally, putting the related terms together yields the unit cost expression at (10).
i
Proof of Proposition 2.3
















The first term inside the square brackets (Ω1) is greater than 1 whereas the second term (Ω2) is
smaller than 1. Therefore, the impact of more flexibility on cost of production depends on λ and α.
Specifically, if
λα(1− λ)1−α < αα(1− α)1−α (33)




λα(1− λ)1−α = α,
which implies that the highest value the LHS of (33) could attain equals to αα(1−α)1−α. Therefore,
λα(1− λ)1−α ≤ αα(1− α)1−α for all λ, α ∈ [0, 1].
Solution with frictions in the Factor Choice Stage




s.t. Y = [λ(aKK)
ρ + (1− λ)(aLL)ρ]
1
ρ (35)
K ≤ K̄ (36)
Let’s denote the lagrange multiplier with respect to the constraint (35) with µ1 and the lagrange
multiplier with respect to 36 with η. Assuming a binding capital constraint (η > 0) and solving
for µ1 will again provide us with the unit cost of producing one extra unit of output. First order
conditions with respect to K and L are as the following:








⇒ K = µ
1
1−ρ



























Putting (37) and (38) together solves for the optimized K/L ratio expressed at (11). Plugging K



























and solving for µ1 gives the unit cost of production at (12).
ii
Solution with frictions in the Technique Choice Stage
The constrained technique choice problem yields the first order conditions with respect to aK and
aL expressed at (13). Using the respective partial derivatives of c(.) and H(.) implies:




























































which together lead to the aK/aL ratio at (14). This can then be substituted into (1) to obtain the
levels of aK and aL expressed at (16) and (17). The unit cost of production as a function of the two
distortions, η and φ, can be derived as:
c(r, w) =
[(


































Putting related terms together and manipulating, we obtain the expression at (18).
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Distortionary wedge against a particular production technique (for instance aK in the particular case
that we analyze) implies that the relative use of that technique is lower compared to an unconstrained
benchmark. Using (6), (13) and (14) a sub-optimally low aK usage implies that: when ρ < 0 then
φ > 0 and when 0 < ρ < 1, then −1 < φ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.1






π(zi) = h1(zi)h2(ρ), (40)








With η-shocks, we can isolate the component that includes the ρ terms as in the following:








where the cutoff η∗ determines the threshold level of η at which a firm is indifferent between to-
produce and not-to-produce.
With φ-shocks, this time we write:








where the cutoff φ∗ determines the threshold level of η at which a firm is indifferent between to-
produce and not-to-produce.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
We can derive the firm-specific component of MRPK and MRPL as the following:































{log [(1 + η)ρχK + χL]− log [χK + χL]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
+
(1 + η)ρ−1χK + χL
(1 + η)ρχK + χL︸ ︷︷ ︸
II
(52)
The RHS of the expression at (52) increases in ρ until some threshold ρ̄ > 0 is reached, and then
it decreases in ρ. To see this, note that for ρ < 0, the first term of the RHS is always positive, and
so is the second term. Therefore for ρ < 0, increases in ρ are always associated with decreases in







(1 + η)ρ̄χK + χL
]
− log [χK + χL]
}
=
(1 + η)ρ̄−1χK + χL
(1 + η)ρ̄χK + χL
,
such that whenever ρ < ρ̄, the TFPQ losses are still declining in ρ and for ρ > ρ̄ the TFPQ losses
start to increase in ρ. Note that the existence of a ρ̄ < 1 depends on the parameter conditions of the
economy. If ρ̄ > 1, then for all values of ρ, increases in ρ reduces the TFPQ losses resulting from
techniques adjustability.
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Note that for KL = 1, the optimized aK and aL combination equals to
aK
z = 1 and
aL
z = 1; which
is the exogenously specified technique level in the neoclassical production function above. Similarly,




z are as derived at equation (53). Hence, for all K/L
within the [κ, 1] boundaries, when K/L ratio is closer to κ then the neoclassical TFPQ is dominated
by the TFPQ with adjustable techniques, and vice versa when K/L ratio is closer to 1.
Proof of Lemma 4.8
∂κ
∂η > 0, and TFPQneo at κ is constant with respect to the changes in η. Furthermore, the TFPQ
with adjustable techniques (TFPQ) satisfies TFPQ → TFPQneo as η decreases for κ < 1, and
TFPQ→ TFPQneo as η increases for κ > 1.






{log [(1 + η)ρϕKθK + ϕLθL]− log [θK + θL]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
+
(1 + η)ρ−1ϕKθK + ϕLθL
(1 + η)ρϕKθK + ϕLθL︸ ︷︷ ︸
II
(54)
The RHS of the expression at (54) increases in ρ until some threshold ρ̄ > 0 is reached, and then it
decreases in ρ. To see this, note that for ρ < 0, the first term of the RHS is always positive, and so
is the second term. Therefore for ρ < 0, increases in ρ are always associated with decreases in the







(1 + η)ρ̃ϕKθK + ϕLθL
]
− log [θK + θL]
}
=
(1 + η)ρ̃−1ϕKθK + ϕLθL
(1 + η)ρ̃ϕKθK + ϕLθL
,
such that whenever ρ < ρ̄, the TFPQ differential is declining in ρ and for ρ > ρ̄ the TFPQ differential
starts to increase in ρ. Note that the existence of a ρ̄ < 1 depends on the parameter conditions of
the economy. If ρ̄ > 1, then for all values of ρ, increases in ρ reduces the TFPQ differential. We
summarize this theoretical result as the following.
Proof of Lemma 4.10
The proof follows from the same lines as in the proof of Lemma 4.5.
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